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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects on employment of increasing the stock
of public capital. To this end, we derive a wage equation so that wages are
endogenized. This allows us to show that, by means of a higher elasticity
of labour demand with respect to wages, a rise in public capital increases
employment. The estimation of a structural model for the Spanish private
sector tests and con…rms empirically this relationship. The results show
that an increase in public capital has a signi…cant and positive direct in-
‡uence on employment, and indirect e¤ects derived from lower wages and
higher economic growth. Finally, we undertake a simulation exercise to as-
sess the long run e¤ects on employment and economic growth of increasing
public capital.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is twofold: …rst, to provide a theoretical rationale for which
there should be a positive relationship between the stock of public capital and the
long-run level of employment; and, second, to illustrate empirically the magnitude
of this relationship for the Spanish case.
Theoretical literature has explored the relationship between public capital and
growth (see Barro 1990, among others). This literature has also explored the rela-
tionship between employment and growth (see Bean and Pissarides 1993, Aghion
and Howitt 1994, Eriksson 1997, Daveri and Tabellini 2000, and Daveri and Maf-
fezzoli 1999). However, to the best of our knowledge, theoretical literature has
not provided a rationale to explain the observed long-run relationship between
public capital and employment.
Empirical evidence has shown that there is a relationship between public cap-
ital and growth (see Ashauer 1989, and Lynde and Richmond 1993). Recent
empirical evidence has also focused on the relationship between public capital
and the labour market. This is the case of Pereira and Roca-Sagales (1999 and
2001), following a VAR approach, and Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000), using
a structural model based on a labour demand function derived from pro…t maxi-
mization. All of them have shown empirically that public capital positively a¤ects
employment. With respect to the former studies, one of the contributions of this
paper is that it also considers how changes in public capital a¤ect wages and the
accumulation of private capital which, in turn, a¤ect employment.
The theoretical model is built up on the same grounds as the one in Daveri and
Tabellini (2000) and has as main ingredients a labour demand function and a wage
equation. The wage is set by a central union as a mark-up over the unemployment
bene…t, with the feature that this mark-up decreases as the elasticity of labour
demand with respect to wages increases. The main di¤erence with the paper by
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) is that this elasticity is not constant. More precisely,
we show that this elasticity rises when there is an increase in the ratio of public to
private capital. In turn, this relationship implies that a rise in this ratio reduces
the wage and, hence, increases employment. This e¤ect justi…es the positive
relationship between long-run employment and public capital.
From the theoretical model, we derive a production function, a labour demand
equation and a wage equation. The relationships among the variables, established
in the theoretical setup, are tested using data for the Spanish economy. In par-
ticular, we estimate a structural model using three stage least squares (3SLS,
henceforth) and …nd that the predictions emerging from the theoretical model are
not rejected by the data. The main …nding is that, along the wage equation, the
negative e¤ect on wages of an increase in the ratio of public to private capital is
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strongly supported by data.
As above mentioned, the aim of the paper is to test for the existence of positive
long-run e¤ects on employment derived from higher levels of public capital. Since
in the long run employment depends on the stock of private capital, we must take
into account that increasing public capital modi…es the stock of private capital.
Thus, the accumulation of private capital must be endogenized. To this end,
we extend the theoretical model by means of introducing consumers that decide
between present and future consumption. This decision de…nes savings and thus
the accumulation of private capital. The equation that de…nes the accumulation
of capital is estimated and we use the results of this estimation to simulate the
consequences of increasing public capital.
The simulation, which can be interpreted as a …scal policy exercise, consists
in increasing public capital so that the ratio of public to private capital increases
1%. We assume that the rise in the ratio is permanent. We then compare the
long-run path of the endogenous variables in the presence and in the absence
of the …scal shock and observe that the e¤ects on the labour market can be
summarized in a rise on, both, employment and wages. Even if wages grow, there
is a rise in employment. Partially, this is due to an increase in the elasticity of
the labour demand with respect to wages, which prevents wages to grow rapidly.
With respect to the consequences on output there is an increase in the growth
rate of GDP. This e¤ect on production is decomposed into a direct e¤ect that is
summarized in the rise of Total Factor Productivity (TFP, henceforth) and an
indirect e¤ect consisting in the increase of the production factors (private capital
and employment).
Concerning the short run e¤ects, we show that the increase in the ratio of
public to private capital initially reduces wages. This initial reduction in wages
is explained by the increase in the elasticity of the labour demand. This reduc-
tion drives the short run paths of employment and output growth that initially
overshoot and then decrease as the wage recovers from the initial reduction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
theoretical model of the labour market and derive the labour demand and the wage
equations. In Section 3, we estimate a structural model for the Spanish economy,
which is used in Section 4 for a simulation exercise. Section 5 summarizes the
results and concludes.
2. The labour Market
In this section we present a simple theoretical model that provides an explanation
for the observed relationship between employment and public capital. To this end,
we develop a model where unions set the wage and …rms set the labour demand.
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Following the seminal paper by Barro (1990), we de…ne the following aggregate
production function:
Yt = ©(Kt; Nt; Xt); ©K > 0; ©N > 0; ©X > 0; ©KK < 0; ©NN < 0; ©KN > 0;
where Yt is gross domestic product (GDP, henceforth). We assume that the pro-
duction function is linearly homogeneous and concave with respect to both the
aggregate stock of private capital, Kt; and the number of employed workers in the
economy, Nt. Moreover, we also assume that the production function is linearly
homogeneous with respect to both Kt and the stock of public capital, Xt: Because
of this assumption, the production function can be rewritten as follows
Yt = F (Kt; Gt; Nt) = KtÁ (Gt; Nt) ; FG > 0; FK > 0; FN > 0; (2.1)
where Gt = XtKt : Given that the ratio Gt is constant in the long run, the production
function is asymptotically an AK production function. This explains sustained
growth.
We assume that there is a large number of …rms in the economy and, hence,
they are price takers. Pro…t maximization implies
rt = FK(Gt; Kt; Nt); (2.2)
wt = FN(Gt; Kt;Nt); (2.3)
where rt is the real interest rate, FK is the marginal product of private capital,
wt is the labour income, and FN is the marginal product of labour.
Equation (2.3) characterizes the labour demand, fN d (wt; Kt; Gt). Because of
the assumptions made on the production function, the following derivatives are
satis…ed along the labour demand equation: @ eN
d
@wt
< 0; @ eN
d
@Kt
> 0; and @ eN
d
@Gt
> 0: The
…rst derivative implies that the labour demand is downward slopping. The sign
of the other two derivatives follows because both the stock of private capital and
the ratio of public to private capital increase the marginal product of labour.
We introduce a central union that sets the wage in order to maximize the
workers’ income
fNd (wt; Gt; Kt) (1¡ ¿w;t)wt +
³
1¡ fN d (wt; Gt; Kt)
´
Bt,
where ¿w;t 2 [0; 1) is the tax on the labour income, Bt is the unemployment
bene…t net of taxes that an unemployed worker gets and 1¡ fNd (wt; Gt; Kt) is the
amount of unemployment. Since we assume that the labour supply is inelastic with
respect to the wage, we normalize it to one. Therefore, the wage that maximizes
the workers’ income is
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wt = ~w(Bt; ¿w;t; "t) =
Bt
(1¡ ¿w;t)
³
1¡ 1"t
´; (2.4)
where "t is the elasticity of the labour demand with respect to wages, which is
equal to
"t (Gt; Nt) =
¯¯
¯¯
¯
@fN d
@wt
wt
fNd
¯¯
¯¯
¯ =
¯¯
¯¯
¯
ÁN (Gt; Nt)
NtÁNN(Gt;Nt)
¯¯
¯¯
¯ :
Equation (2.4) is the wage equation. Using this equation, we get that @ ~w@Bt > 0 ,
@ ~w
@¿w;t
> 0 and @ ~w@"t < 0 : The previous derivatives show that an increase in both the
unemployment bene…t and the tax rate on labour income increase wages. This
occurs because, when either the unemployment bene…t or the tax rate increase,
the di¤erence between the income perceived by employed and unemployed workers
decreases. As this di¤erence decreases, workers’ income maximization implies a
larger wage. With regard to the sign on the third derivative, an increase in the
elasticity of the labour demand reduces the wage because it makes the labour
demand more sensitive to higher wages.
Combining (2.4) and (2.3), we derive the equilibrium equation of the labour
market
FN (Gt; Kt; Nt) = wt =
Bt
(1¡ ¿w;t)
³
1¡ 1"t
´ :
It is well accepted in the literature that the labour’s share in the aggregate
income is constant in the long run, i.e. FN = ¯
³
Yt
Nt
´
: Moreover, we assume
that the unemployment bene…t is a constant fraction (v) of per capita income,
i.e. Bt = vYt: Using these relationships, the equilibrium equation in the labour
market simpli…es to
¯Yt
Nt
=
vYt
(1¡ ¿w;t)
³
1¡ 1"t
´ ;
which can be rewritten as follows
Nt =
Ã
¯
v
!
(1¡ ¿w;t)
µ
1¡
1
"t
¶
: (2.5)
Equation (2.5) implies that a higher level of public capital will increase the
long run equilibrium amount of employment if it rises the elasticity of the labour
demand.1 An example of a production function displaying this positive relation-
ship is the constant elasticity of substitution when the elasticity of substitution
1This theoretical result was obtained in a more particular setting by Raurich and Sorolla
(2000). In this paper, it is shown that the elasticity will increase or decrease with the ratio of
public to private capital depending on the assumptions made on the production function.
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is non-unitary, i.e. Á (Gt; Nt) = (aG½t + bN
½
t )
1
½ and ½ 6= 0:2 Thus, (2.5) suggests
a channel through which public capital may increase the equilibrium level of em-
ployment.3 This channel is based on technological changes associated with shifts
in the ratio of public to private capital stock.
Existing literature has explained the relationship between public capital and
employment as a complementarity between these two inputs. More precisely,
public capital enhances the marginal product of labour and this explains the
positive e¤ect on employment. However, in our model, this positive e¤ect is
o¤set by the long run increase in the reservation wage, which coincides with the
unemployment bene…t. Blanchard and Katz (1997) have already argued that
increases in productivity do not a¤ect employment in the long run because, in
association with the increase in productivity, there is a rise in the reservation
wage. Therefore, the only channel through which public capital may increase
employment in the long run is by rising the elasticity of the labour demand.
Note that the elasticity of labour demand depends on the ratio of public to
private capital. Thus, public capital may a¤ect the elasticity by increasing this
ratio. The existence of a positive relationship between the elasticity of the labour
demand and this ratio seems to …nd some empirical support in the Spanish case.
Using data for more than three decades we compute the percentage change of
employment in the private sector with respect to the percentage change in real
wages of the private sector. Since we are interested in long-run relationships,
we take the permanent component of each series by …lttering them using the
Hodrick and Prescott …lter. This gives us a …rst raw approximation to the long-
run elasticity of employment with respect to wages in the private sector, which
shows to be non-constant through time. Moreover, we also take the permanent
components of the public and private capital stock series and compute the long-run
path of their ratio. When compared with the long-run elasticity of employment
with respect to wages, we identify a positive relationship between the two. This
is illustrated by the following raw OLS regression:
"t =¡0:77
(¡5:94)
+ 6:21
(6:76)
Gt;
2Note that if Á (Gt; Nt) is a constant elasticity of substitution production function and the
elasticity of substitution is non-unitary then FN does not coincide with ¯
³
Yt
Nt
´
unless we
consider a more general production function with externalities. As an example consider that
Yt = K1¡¯t K
¯
t N
¯
t
³
aG½t + bN
½
t
´ 1
½
where N t and Kt are externalities. This production function
allows for sustained growth, zero pro…ts, the marginal product of labor is a constant fraction of
production at the …rms level, and the elasticity of the labor demand increases with the stock of
public capital at the aggregate level. For simplicity, we have not introduced externalities in the
theoretical exposition. See appendix for further discussion.
3See appendix for further discussion on the wage setting device.
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with a R2 = 0:60. Therefore, despite the crudeness of this exercise, at least
provisionally we can identify a close relationship between the elasticity and the
ratio of public to private capital over the period 1966-1998.
In the following section, we will use (2.1), (2.3) and (2.4) to estimate a multi-
equation model for the Spanish economy and carry on the empirical analysis.
3. A Structural Model for the Spanish Economy
To undertake the empirical analysis we have estimated a structural model for the
Spanish private sector.4 Each of the three equations are mirrored in the theoretical
model in such a way that the labour demand equation (2.3) gives rise to
nprt = ®0 + ®1n
pr
t¡1 + ®2n
pr
t¡2 + ®3kt + ®4gt + ®5w
pr
t + ®6it + ®7t+ u1t; (3.1)
the wage equation5 (2.4) to
wprt = ¯0+¯1w
pr
t¡1+¯2w
pr
t¡2+¯3gt+¯4xt+¯5µ
pr
t +¯6n
pr
t¡1+¯7d
84+¯8d
87+u2t; (3.2)
and the production function (2.1) to
yprt = °0+°1y
pr
t¡1+°
pr
2 yt¡2+°3n
pr
t +°4n
pr
t¡1+°5kt+°6gt¡1+°7t+°8t
1:5+u3t: (3.3)
De…nitions of the variables are given in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1]
The model is estimated using the ARDL approach which yields consistent
estimates of the parameters both in the short and in the long-run (see Pesaran,
Shin and Smith (1996), Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1998)). This
approach can be applied irrespective of wether the regressors are I(1) or I(0),
and avoids the pre-testing problems associated with the standard cointegration
analysis6. Each of the equations was …rst estimated individually by OLS and all
of them passed the usual misspeci…cation tests and structural stability tests such
4The analysis has been limited to the private sector because the labor demand in the public
sector may not be related with the labor marginal product and, hence, the introduction of the
public sector in the analysis would distort the results of the estimation.
5Note that what we have called xt in the wage equation (3.2) does not appear in Table 1.
The reason is that this variable indicates a double possibility for the wage equation, a …rst one in
which we have bsst as exogenous variable, and a second one in which we have ¿dt . This distinction
allows us to estimate two versions of the model. We justify this procedure below.
6“The ARDL approach has the additional advantage of yielding consistent estimates of
the long-run coe¢cients that are asymptotically normal irrespective of wether the underlying
regressors are I(1) or I(0)”, Pesaran and Shin (1998), page 371.
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as the Cusum and CusumQ7. The …nal speci…cation was selected on the basis of
either the Akaike Information Criterion or the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. In a
second stage, the system as a whole was estimated by 3SLS. In this way we avoid
serial correlation and endogeneity problems.
According to the theoretical setting in Section 2, we introduce (and test) the
following restriction to the underlying technology: the estimated production func-
tion is a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale to the production
factors8. Thus, for consistency, we impose the long-run elasticity of employment
with respect to capital stock along the labour demand to be unity, something that
is not rejected by the data.9 Having imposed this restriction, we estimate again
the model. This gives rise to the restricted 3SLS estimation, which is the one
used in the simulation presented in next section.
One of the econometric requirements for a well speci…ed model is structural
stability of the estimated parameters. Considering this, we will use the results of
this model to infer in the next section long run relationships, out of the sample
period. We are aware this is not the perfect procedure given the theoretical
production function postulated in (2.1), but we think our empirical exercise as an
illustration of what the long-run relationship among the variables would be taking
as a base-run case our sample period estimated parameters.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 below, each of them corresponding to one of the selected
equations, show the results of both the OLS and of the restricted 3SLS estimation.
For the later we provide two sets of results, each one corresponding to one of the
speci…cations of the wage equation.
Table 2 shows that the labour demand in the private sector depends negatively
on both real wages and real interest rates. The negative relationship between em-
ployment and wages is due to the negative slope of the labour demand function,
and the negative relationship between the interest rate and employment summa-
rizes output e¤ects on employment. Employment growth is driven by the private
capital stock and the ratio of public to private capital stock, two relationships
that were predicted in Section 2. Finally, a trend with a negative sign captures
7The results on these tests are available upon request.
8Note that the estimated production function does not correspond exactly to the production
function proposed in Section 2. The discrepancy is due to the existence of externalities that for
simplicity are not taken into account in Section 2. However, we can also consider the following
production function Yt = K¯t ¹K
1¡¯
t N
1¡¯
t Á(Gt; ¹Nt), where ¹Kt and ¹Nt are externalities. Equation
(3.3) emerges from this function.
9A Wald test on the restriction °3+°4+°51¡°1¡°2 = 1 in the production function could not be rejected
at the usual 5% critical value. The Wald test gave a value of 1:50, which has to be compared
with a Â25% = 3:84.
The Wald test on the restriction ®31¡®1¡®2 = 1 in the labor demand equation could not be
rejected either. This test gave a value of 1.89, below the standard 5% critical value Â25% = 3:84.
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the direct in‡uence of labour-saving technological change on employment.
[Insert Table 2]
Table 3 shows that wages are positively a¤ected by productivity and lagged
employment.10 The later in‡uence arises from an insider-outsider argument by
which, the higher the number of new employees (entrants) in past year, the higher
the number of insiders in this year. As it is well known, the in‡uence of insiders
in the wage setting mechanism is to drive wages up11. Though relevant, this
relationship has not been considered in Section 2 because of the static nature of
the model considered. Two dummies, a …rst one taking value 1 1984 onwards
and a second one taking value 1 1987 onwards, capture the e¤ect of two major
institutional events in Spain. The …rst one is the downward pressure on wages
derived from the …rst labour market reform. This reform was undertaken in 1984
and focused on …xed-term contracts as a way of enhancing ‡exibility in the labour
market. The second one captures the downward pressure on wages derived from
the Spanish entry into the EEC in 1986.
[Insert Table 3]
The wage equation deserves two additional remarks. The …rst one concerns
the alternative presence in the wage equation of either Social Security bene…ts per
employee12 or the direct tax rate. Both, a descriptive analysis of these two series
and the estimation of di¤erent functional forms for the wage equation indicate that
they are essentially capturing the same phenomenon. Our interpretation relates
to the build up of a complete welfare state in Spain in last decades, which required
the development of a Social Security system almost inexistent before democracy.
As a consequence, Social Security bene…ts per employee raised in parallel to direct
taxes, which started to grow steadily after a 1978 tax reform aiming to increase
public receipts. This was in accordance to the new growing …nancial needs of the
public sector13.
10The mainstream empirical analysis report the e¤ect of unemployment on wages. However,
in this paper, we are just concerned with employment and economic growth. We do not consider
a labor supply equation because data on the labor supply is not available for institutional sectors
and, thus, we can not take endogenously into account the unemployment rate. Therefore, this
variable has to be left out from the analysis.
11For a theoretical analysis of this mechanism see Lindbeck and Snower (1988). Karanassou
and Snower (2000) report empirical estimates of this sort.
12In the theoretical setup we use unemployment bene…ts, which are a fraction of the whole
Social Security bene…ts. In the empirical analysis, though, we use the later variable as it better
captures the reservation wage.
13The rate of public expenditures to GDP raised from less than 25% in the mid seventies,
before democracy (which was attained in 1977), to approximately 45% in mid eighties. In
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The expansion of the Welfare State introduces an upward pressure on wages
because, as mentioned in Section 2, the increase in either Social Security bene…ts
or direct taxes reduce the di¤erence between the income earned by employed and
unemployed workers and, as a consequence, there is a rise in the wage.
The …rst channel of expansion of the welfare state are Social Security bene-
…ts, which is a trended variable. Hence, in order to capture the change in the
in‡uence of this variable on wages after the 1978 tax reform, the equation needs
a dummy variable. This is the reason why the …rst speci…cation of the wage
equation presents bss and a multiplicative dummy bss¡78(= bss ¤ d78), both with a
positive sign, which shows the upward pressure on wages and the increase in this
upward pressure. The second channel are direct taxes, a variable that captures
by itself the change in 1978, so that there is no need of a multiplicative dummy.
Again, the coe¢cient associated to direct taxes has a positive sign.
The second remark refers to the role of the ratio of public to private capital.
An increase in this ratio reduces wages, with a long-run elasticity that does not
di¤er much among the two selected functional forms. This is a key result, as it
gives empirical evidence in support of our main theoretical claim. Recall that the
rationale for this result may arise from changes in the production function that
will end up in a higher elasticity of the labour demand with respect to wages.
Further on, the in‡uence of this ratio on the wage setting mechanism provides a
channel whereby private employment is a¤ected by public capital availability.
Table 4 presents the estimated production function. As noted before, the es-
timated production function has a Cobb-Douglas functional form displaying con-
stant returns to scale. Output in the private sector depends on the two standard
production factors (capital stock and labour, private in both cases) plus di¤erent
terms that capture total factor productivity (TFP, henceforth). These terms con-
sist of two trends, a standard linear one with a positive sign, that drives output
upwards; and a non-linear one, with a negative sign that takes into account some
negative externalities. Finally, still derived from the theoretical set up, g has a
highly signi…cant in‡uence on production that shows up by driving upwards the
TFP.
[Insert Table 4]
An important remark related to these results refers to the long-run elasticity
of output to public capital, which the literature has placed, with some degree
of consensus, around 0.2 (see Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997). While in these
studies this elasticity (z) is directly taken from the level of public capital stock, in
parallel, direct taxes raised from less than 4% in the mid-seventies to more than 7% in 1984 and
more than 10% 1989 onwards.
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this case we evaluate the long-run in‡uence of the ratio public to private capital
stock. Therefore, instead of having z = ¢Y=Y¢X=X , we consider z
0 = ¢Y=Y(¢G=G) . Given
that ¢G=G = ¢X=X ¡¢K=K; we can rewrite z0 as z0 = ¢Y=Y(¢X=X)¡(¢K=K) . This
equation leads to
z = z0
Ã
1¡
¢K=K
¢X=X
!
;
which shows that z = z0 only if ¢K=K¢X=X = 0. As in our sample period
¢K=K
¢X=X = 0:59
14
and in the OLS estimation z0 = 0:47, z = 0:19, a value in the lower range of the
estimates given by the literature.
Even if it requires a further analysis, the …nding of a positive and signi…cant
e¤ect of g on both private output and employment, and a negative e¤ect on
wages introduces a new insight on the debate surrounding public activity. Taxes
have been blamed to be responsible for higher unemployment rates (see Daveri
and Tabellini 2000, among others), but the allocation of tax revenues on public
capital may have a positive impact on economic activity that will end up in higher
levels of production and employment. Next section further explores this issue.
Summing up, in meeting all the theoretical and econometric requirements, we
think the estimated structural model provides a …rst piece of empirical evidence
on the positive in‡uence that a higher ratio of public to private capital stock
has on private employment due to di¤erent channels: the …rst one being a direct
positive e¤ect on the marginal productivity of employment that enhances the
labour demand; the second one, stressed in Section 2, a negative e¤ect on real
wages that will -indirectly- enhance hirings; and a third one being a positive e¤ect
on production by means of a higher TFP. The third e¤ect, as we will show in next
section, implies an acceleration in the accumulation of private capital that also
enhances the labour demand, and thus employment in the long run.
The former analysis provides us with a benchmark where to conduct a sim-
ulation exercise to further study the long-run implications of increasing public
capital. We undertake this simulation exercise in next section.
4. Assessing the Long-Run E¤ects of Public Capital on Em-
ployment and Growth
Employment and output growth depend on the stock of private capital. Therefore,
the long run e¤ects of government policies will also depend on the e¤ects that these
14This value was obtained following di¤erent steps: 1) taking the annual growth rate of public
and private capital stock (¢Kt=Kt and ¢Xt=Xt); 2) computing the annual ratio of the two
growth rates [(¢K=K)t = (¢X=X)t]; 3) taking the sample period mean of the annual ratio
(¢K=K)t = (¢X=X)t:
11
government policies have on the accumulation of private capital. This means that
in order to simulate the long run e¤ects on employment and growth of increasing
public capital we must …rst consider how agents’ decisions on savings are a¤ected
by government policies, then, relate savings with the accumulation of private
capital and …nally relate private capital growth with output growth. To this
end, we start extending the theoretical model of Section 2, considering a simple
overlapping generations model where agents live for two periods. In the …rst
period, agents inelastically supply one unit of time, they receive an income It;
and they save. This income coincides with the wage net of taxes, wt (1¡ ¿w;t) ;
when agents are employed and it coincides with the unemployment bene…t, Bt;
when agents are unemployed. In the second period, they consume the savings
accumulated in the …rst period.
We assume that agents derive utility from their consumption in each period.
We also assume that agents’ preferences are homothetic so that savings are a
constant fraction of income, s 2 (0; 1). Moreover, because present savings will be
the future stock of capital, it follows that the aggregate stock of capital is
Kt+1 = s [(1¡ ¿w;t)wtNt +Bt(1¡Nt)] : (4.1)
This equation shows that aggregate capital is a constant fraction of the agent’s
income obtained in their …rst period of life. From (4.1), the growth rate of capital
is
Kt+1
Kt
=
(1¡ ¿w;t)wtNt +Bt(1¡Nt)
(1¡ ¿w;t¡1)wt¡1Nt¡1 +Bt¡1(1¡Nt¡1)
:
Let us de…ne the gross growth rate of wages as !t = wtwt¡1 ; the gross growth rate of
the unemployment bene…t as ±t = BtBt¡1 ; and the gross growth rate of population
as ´t = NtNt¡1 : Using these transformed variables, the previous equation can be
rewritten as follows
Kt+1
Kt
=
(1¡¿w;t)!t´t
Bt¡1
+ ±t (1¡Nt)Nt¡1wt¡1
(1¡¿w;t¡1)
Bt¡1
+ 1¡Nt¡1Nt¡1wt¡1
:
In Section 2, we have argued that Nt¡1wt¡1 = ¯Yt¡1 and that Bt¡1 = vYt¡1:
Taking into account these equations, we can further rewrite the growth rate of
capital as follows
Kt+1
Kt
=
¯(1¡ ¿w;t)!t´t + v±t (1¡Nt)
¯ (1¡ ¿w;t¡1) + v (1¡Nt¡1)
: (4.2)
Thus, the growth rate of capital positively depends on the growth rate of
wages, the growth rate of labour, and the growth rate of Social Security bene…ts,
and it negatively depends on the level of direct taxes.
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Back again to the empirical implementation of the model, we will use (4.2)
and (2.1) to estimate the growth rate of private capital and the growth rate of
GDP. In particular, taking equation (4.2) as a reference, we estimate the following
expression:
¢kprt = ¸0 + ¸1¢n
pr
t + ¸2¢w
pr
t + ¸3¢bsst + ¸4¿
d
t + ¸5ct¡1 + u4t; (4.3)
where the operator ¢ means the increase in the variable and ct is competitive-
ness.15 De…ned as in Table 1, competitiveness helps to capture the consequences
of external shocks, such as the oil price ones in the seventies.
The production function depends on private capital, employment and TFP.
Therefore, the growth rate of GDP will positively depend on the growth rate of
capital, employment and TFP. The variables ¢wprt ; ¢bsst¡1 ; ¿ dt capture the growth
rate of capital and at is the growth rate of TFP. Accordingly, we estimate the
following economic growth equation:
¢yprt = ¹0+¹1¢y
pr
t¡1+¹2at+¹3¢n
pr
t +¹4¢n
pr
t¡1+¹5¢w
pr
t +¹6¢b
ss
t¡1+¹7¿
d
t +u5t:
(4.4)
Estimation of at is obtained from equation (3.3). More precisely, TFP is
obtained as the fraction of GDP not explained by private production factors i.e.,
°6gt + °7t+ °8t1:5.16 Finally, at is the gross growth rate of TFP, i.e.
at =
TFPt+1
TFPt
=
Ã
°6gt+1 + °7 (t+ 1) + °8 (t+ 1)
1:5
°6gt + °7t+ °8t1:5
!
: (4.5)
Table 5 shows the results obtained in the estimation of (4.3) and (4.4). Note
that the growth rate of capital rises with the growth rates of employment, wages
and Social Security bene…ts, and it decreases as the direct tax rate increases.
Thus, as (4.2) predicts, capital accumulation is accelerated when workers’ income
increases. The growth rate of GDP positively depends on the growth rates of
employment, TFP, wages and Social Security bene…ts and negatively depends on
direct taxes.
[Insert Table 5]
15Note that ¢yprt ; ¢k
pr
t ; ¢n
pr
t ; ¢w
pr
t , and ¢b
pr
t are the growth rates of Y
pr
t ; K
pr
t ; N
pr
t ; W
pr
t ,
and Bprt ; respectively.
16In the theoretical model we introduce the simplifying assumption that TFP only depends
on the ratio of public to private capital. However, there are externalities that also a¤ect TFP
and that must be taken into account in the empirical model. This externalities are summarized
by the two trends.
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Summing up, we have an empirical model that captures our main theoretical
…ndings. This system includes expressions (3.1), (3.2), (4.3) and (4.4), and allows
us to attempt an evaluation of the economic consequences of increasing public
capital. In what follows, we undertake a …scal policy exercise which simulates the
e¤ects on private employment and on economic growth of increasing the ratio of
public to private capital when public capital is …nanced by means of taxes on the
interest rate. Because the utility function is homothetic, taxes on the interest rate
do not distort agents’ decisions on savings.17
To simulate the impact of a rise in gt; we solve the empirical model forward
under di¤erent assumptions that a¤ect the long-run behavior of the variables.
First, the endogenous variables time path is explained by the base-run equations
of the model (3.1), (3.2), (4.3) and (4.4). For the long run value of TFP we have
the auxiliar equation (4.5). Thus, given the value of gt, we know the time path of
at. With respect to the exogenous variables, apart from the trends and dummies,
we must introduce assumptions on the time path of gt, bsst , ¿dt , it, ct.
Note that gt, ¿ dt , it and ct are all I(0) variables, whereas bsst is a trended
variable. In the long-run, we expect all the I(0) variables to stabilize in such a
way that they can be considered as constants. As a consequence, we could assume
that the long-run value of these variables coincides with the last one available.
Nevertheless, we do not need to make such an assumption. The reason is that
we will evaluate the response of the endogenous variables in the presence and in
the absence of a particular …scal shock. In this case, the assumption made on the
value of the I(0) variables will not a¤ect the results of the simulation exercise.
With respect to bsst , as a growing variable, we need to simulate its long-run
behavior. We follow Section 2 and we assume that Bsst is a constant fraction of
GDP, which is set equal to the last available value of this fraction.18
Once the model can be solved forward, we simulate it. To this end, we …rst
keep the ratio of public to private capital at the same value as in 1998; then, we
introduce a 1% permanent increase in the 1999 value with respect to that of 1998.
This is done under two scenarios, a …rst one with the model in which bsst a¤ects the
wage setting mechanism, and a second one where, instead, the relevant regressor
in the wage equation is ¿dt . Figures 1 and 2 show, under these two scenarios,
the long-run consequences of this expansionary …scal policy on both the labour
market and economic growth.
Note that in the …gures we always refer to the growth rate of a particular
variable. The reason is that we evaluate the e¤ects of the permanent shock in
terms of how would a particular variable change in the long run in response to the
new situation. This change is stated in growth rates resulting from comparing the
17The budget constraint is Xt = ¿krtKt: It can be rewritten as follows Gt = ¿krt:
18Note that this assumption implies that ¢bsst = ¢y
pr
t .
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time path of the variable in the presence and the absence of the shock. Given that
the variables are expressed in logarithms, this di¤erence is equivalent to a growth
rate. We consider that a particular series has converged once its value completely
stabilises. This is the long run value of that particular series in response to the
shock. When stating that a 90% of convergence is achieved we indicate that the
variable has attained, at least, 90% of its long run value.
[Insert Figure 1 and Insert Figure 2 ]
Our simulation exercise shows that a 1% permanent increase in gt has a pos-
itive e¤ect on private employment. This e¤ect seems to be robust across the
two di¤erent speci…cations of the wage equation, and attains a long run value of
0.47% under the …rst scenario and of 0.43% under the second one. This is the
total consequence of the shock operating through several channels in the system.
Further on, we can decompose this impact on its various sources and isolate the
e¤ect due to the in‡uence of gt on the wage setting mechanism. When only this
channel is active, employment in the long-run would rise 0.20% in the …rst case,
and 0.23% in the second one. Despite this should be taken just as a simulation
exercise on the basis of a concrete model, this …nding gives additional evidence on
the positive link between employment and public capital through the wage e¤ect
derived in section 2.
The main di¤erence between the two scenarios is in the speed of convergence.
In the …rst scenario it takes 24 years for employment to converge to a 90% of
the new steady state value (that is, the one after the expansionary …scal policy),
whereas in the second one it just takes 9 years. The reason for this di¤erence,
that is common to two other endogenous variables (real wages and capital stock)
lies in the presence of a trended exogenous variable such as bsst . In the other
scenario, ¿dt acts as a constant in the long-run, therefore the system does not need
to accommodate an extra variable to its new steady state. Thus, the transition to
the new equilibrium in this case is rapidly completed. Note also that, under the
second scenario, the new steady state is achieved, for all the endogenous variables,
within a decade.
Despite the long-run response of wages to the …scal shock is positive in both
cases, it di¤ers substantially among scenarios. In the …rst case, increases by 0.29%,
whereas under the second scenario attains 0.69%. This result is in accordance
with the better economic growth e¤ects that Figure 2b displays with respect to
Figure 1b. Indeed, we expect labour to have a higher compensation rate in an
economy with higher levels of productivity, capital stock and, summing up, higher
production. Again, note that, despite these di¤erences across scenarios, the long-
run e¤ect of a change in gt on employment does not show much of variation. This
confers an extra degree of robustness to our results.
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Concerning the long run e¤ects on GDP, note that they are positive and similar
in the two scenarios: in the …rst one GDP growth is 1.34%, whereas it attains
1.45% in the second one. Although this response to the shock may seem relatively
large, we need to point out various aspects on this respect. First, along the same
lines as in Section 3, remark that we are evaluating a change in the ratio of public
to private capital stock whose magnitude is much higher than a shock on the
sole level of public capital stock. Second, we examine the long-run e¤ects in the
context of a dynamic model with a net of lagged adjustment processes in each
of the equations. As it can be seen in both Figures, the impact of gt on GDP
is the outcome of three e¤ects. The direct one on TFP and two indirect e¤ects
which are summarized by the increases in both production factors, capital and
employment. The interaction of these three e¤ects through which the impact of
the shock hits the model with the dynamic structure of the system contribute to
prolong and enhance the e¤ects of the shock.
Another important remark on the results refers to the short-run behavior of
wages. Interpreting the initial impact of this permanent …scal policy change as
the short-run e¤ect, we can argue that the immediate reaction of real wages is
to decrease due to the negative direct in‡uence that gt has in the wage equation.
This negative e¤ect drives the dynamics of the other variables. In particular, the
initial reduction in wages explains the initial large e¤ect on employment that …rst
overshoots, and decreases in the medium run as wages increase. This initial over
reaction explains why the impulse-response functions of GDP and the stock of
private capital overshoot19.
Summing up, the main …nding is that an increase in gt has a long run positive
e¤ect on GDP growth and also on employment even though wages increase. This
occurs because public capital positively a¤ects the labour demand and because
the increase in wages is small when compared with the rise in GDP. Previously,
we have justi…ed the small impact on wage growth by an increase in the elasticity
of the labour demand. Precisely, this e¤ect is shown up by the initial reduction
in wages.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have developed a theoretical model that provides a rationale for the existence
of a positive in‡uence of public capital on employment. Based on this theoret-
ical model, we have estimated a structural model for the Spanish economy and
obtained empirical results in accordance with our theoretical setup. Besides, this
19For a detailed analysis on shock responses within a structural framework see Karanassou
and Snower (2000).
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estimation has allowed to simulate the e¤ects of a …scal shock: that is, the long-
run impact of a permanent increase in public capital on the labour market and
economic growth .
The main result of the paper is that increasing public capital enhances the
growth rates of GDP and private capital stock, rising also wages and employment.
The later e¤ect is explained as a technological e¤ect associated to an increased
level of public capital, and is re‡ected in a higher elasticity of labour demand
with respect to wages that prevents wage growth. This e¤ect is shown up by the
negative relationship between wages and public capital along the wage equation.
The results on the …scal policy exercise illustrate this argument and show a long
run growth rate for wages far below the GDP one. With regard to employment,
the simulation o¤ers what we interpret as a robust result. Indeed, no matter the
scenario we consider, there is a similar response of private employment, which
would increase from 0.43% to 0.47% in response to a 1% increase in the ratio of
public to private capital stock.
In this paper, we have assumed that the way investment in public capital is
…nanced by the government does not distort agents’ decisions. This holds because
we assume that public capital is …nanced by means of taxes on the interest rate
that, due to the assumptions on the consumers’ preferences, do not distort savings.
An alternative would be to assume that the increase in public capital is …nanced
by means of taxes on the labour income, this time distorting agents’ decisions.
Another extension in the same direction is to take into account that social security
bene…ts are …nanced by direct taxes on the labour income. To consider these
alternative assumptions is the aim of future research.
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Appendix
Discussion on the production function
Let us consider the following production function
Yt = AKt (aG½t +N
½
t )
1
½ ; ½ < 1; a > 0; A > 0:
The elasticity of the labour demand with respect to wages is
"t =
@Yt
@Nt
Nt
@2Yt
@N2t
=
AKt(aG½t+N½t )
1
½¡1N½¡1t
NtAKt
³
( 1½¡1)(aG½t+N½t )
1
½ ¡2N (½¡1)2t +(½¡1)(aG½t+N½t )
1
½¡1N½¡2t
´
which simpli…es to
"t = 1
( 1½¡1)
N½t
(aG½t+N½t )
+(½¡1)
:
Note that @"t@Gt > 0 and, however,
@Yt
@Nt
6= ¯ YtNt : In order to simultaneously obtain
that @"t@Gt > 0 and
@Yt
@Nt
= ¯ YtNt externalities must be introduced. As an example
consider the following production function:
Yt = AK1¡¯t K
¯
tN
¯
t
³
aG½t +N
½
t
´ 1
½ ; 0 < ¯ < 1
where Kt and N t are externalities accruing from the average levels of capital and
employment, respectively.
Remark that at the …rm level @Yt@Nt = ¯
Yt
Nt
: Note also that, at the aggregate
level Kt = Kt and Nt = N t: Hence, the production function simpli…es to
Yt = AKtN¯t (aG
½
t +N
½
t )
1
½ :
Thus, the production function is lineal in capital, which means that sustained
growth is possible. Moreover, the elasticity of the labour demand with respect to
wages is
"t =
@Yt
@Nt
Nt
@2Yt
@N2t
=
¯AKtN¯¡1t (aG½t+N½t )
1
½
Nt¯AKt
³
(¯¡1)N¯¡2t (aG½t+N½t )
1
½+N¯¡1t (aG½t+N½t )
1
½¡1N½¡1t
´;
which simpli…es to
"t =
1
¯ ¡ 1 + N
½
t
aG½t+N
½
t
:
Again, note that @"t@Gt > 0:
2
Discussion on the wage setting process
The wage setting process considered in the paper is a very particular one. This
implies that the result summarized in (2.5) may not hold when a more general
wage setting is considered. In what follows we analyze two generalizations of the
wage setting process in order to discuss the robustness of (2.5).
The …rst generalization consists in introducing a wage bargaining between
unions an …rms. We assume the following Nash product:
h
((1¡ ¿w;t)wt ¡Bt) ~Nd(wt; Gt; Kt)
i° h
Yt ¡wt ~Nd(wt; Gt; Kt)
i1¡°
where °, 0 < ° < 1, is a parameter representing union’s bargaining power.
The unions’ aim is to maximize the workers income and the …rms’ aim is to
maximize the …rms pro…ts. Under the assumption that the labour’s share in the
aggregate income is constant in the long run, i.e. wt = ¯ YtNt ; this function becomes
h
((1¡ ¿w;t)wt ¡Bt) ~Nd(wt; Gt; Kt)
i°
"Ã
1¡ ¯
¯
!
wt ~Nd(wt; Gt; Kt)
#1¡°
:
We further assume that unions and …rms bargain on the wage taking into account
that the labour demand is set by …rms as the marginal product of labour and,
hence, it decreases with the wage.
From the …rst order conditions we derive the following wage equation:
wt = w(Bt; ¿w;t; "t; °) =
Bt
(1¡ ¿w;t)
³
"t¡1
"t+°¡1
´ :
Note that, when ° = 1, this equation coincides with (2.4) in the main text.
Assuming that wt = ¯ YtNt and that Bt = vYt; we obtain
Nt =
Ã
¯
v
!
(1¡ ¿w;t)
Ã
"t ¡ 1
"t + ° ¡ 1
!
:
Again, when ° = 1, this gives rise to equation (2.5) in the main text. Fur-
thermore, our central argument is still valid as employment increases with "t and
public capital may only increase employment by rising "t: Thus, the result derived
from the monopoly union model holds in a more general wage bargaining model.
The second generalization consists in modifying the unions’ utility function
by giving di¤erent weights to wage and employment. This implies to consider a
utility function having the following form:
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[(1¡ ¿w;t)w ¡Bt]
°
h
~Nd(wt; Gt; Kt)
i1¡°
:
From the …rst order condition the wage set by unions is
wt =
Bt
(1¡ ¿w;t)
³
1¡
³
°
1¡°
´ ³
1
"t
´´:
Again, assuming that wt = ¯ YtNt and that Bt = vYt; we derive
Nt =
Ã
¯
v
!
(1¡ ¿w;t)
Ã
1¡
Ã
°
1¡ °
! µ 1
"t
¶!
:
Equation (2.5) in the main text follows when the same weight is given to both
employment and wages, i.e. ° = 12 : Again, employment increases with "t and
public capital may only increase employment by rising "t: Therefore, the result
derived in the main text holds when the unions’ utility function is generalized.
We have shown that the main result in the paper holds under two general-
izations of the wage setting process. However, both generalizations are based
on the assumption of intertemporal independence. In other words, the equilib-
rium amount of current employment does not a¤ect the future amount of em-
ployment. Other models consider intertemporal dependence. Among them, the
insider-outsider model. We believe that these models may yield a di¤erent result.
In particular, public capital may also a¤ect employment by means of increasing
the marginal productivity of labour. This would explain our empirical …nding in
section 4 showing that the rise in the elasticity of the labour demand with respect
to wages only accounts for half of the increase in employment.
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Table 1: De…nitions of the variables.
nprt : log of private employment
wprt : log of real wage in the private sector
yprt : log of GDP in the private sector
µprt : average productivity in the private sector de…ned as y
pr
t ¡ n
pr
t
kt : log of private capital stock
kpst : log of public capital stock
gt : log of the ratio of public to private capital stock de…ned as kpst ¡ kt
it : real long-term interest rates
bsst : log of real Social Security Bene…ts per person
¿ dt : total direct taxes as a % of total GDP
ct : competitiveness de…ned as log
³
Import prices
Domestic prices
´
t : linear trend
t1:5 : non-linear trend
di : dummy variable taking value
(
0 from 1967 to i¡ 1
i onwards
)
for i=1978, 1984, 1987
bss¡78t : bsst ¤ d78
Source: Fundación BBVA and OECD, Economic Outlook.
Table 2: labour demand equation. Spain, 1967-1998.
Dependent variable: nprt
OLS Restricted 3SLS¤ Restricted 3SLS¤
(bss in wages) (¿ d in wages)
coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat.
Cnt 1:10 (1:17) 2:36 (6:33) 2:25 (6:00)
nprt¡1 0:92 (5:41) 1:04 (8:48) 1:05 (8:54)
nprt¡2 ¡0:49 (¡3:38) ¡0:58 (¡5:37) ¡0:59 (¡5:42)
kprt 0:70 (4:41) 0:54 (¤¤) 0:54 (¤¤)
gt 0:12 (1:57) 0:12 (1:64) 0:13 (1:90)
wprt ¡0:36 (¡3:72) ¡0:26 (¡5:72) ¡0:24 (¡5:33)
it ¡0:05 (¡4:26) ¡0:05 (¡4:95) ¡0:05 (¡4:88)
t ¡0:02 (¡3:61) ¡0:02 (¡3:69) ¡0:02 (¡3:85)
R2 0:98 0:98 0:98
S:E: 0:010 0:011 0:011
(*): Instruments for the 3SLS estimation: ctt; nprt¡1; n
pr
t¡2; w
pr
t¡1; w
pr
t¡2;
yprt¡1; y
pr
t¡2; kt; k
pr
t¡1; k
ps
t ; k
ps
t¡1; it; ¿dt or bsst ; d84; d87; t; t1:5:
(**): Restricted coe¢cient
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Table 3: Wage equation. Spain, 1967-1998.
Dependent variable: wprt
OLS OLS Restricted 3SLS¤ Restricted 3SLS¤
(bss in wages) (¿d in wages) (bss in wages) (¿ d in wages)
coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat.
Cnt 2:57 (1:39) 0:71 (0:30) 2:03 (1:23) 1:25 (0:55)
wprt¡1 0:60 (4:24) 0:80 (4:58) 0:62 (5:24) 0:80 (5:22)
wprt¡2 ¡0:21 (¡1:54) ¡0:28 (¡1:61) ¡0:18 (¡1:48) ¡0:31 (¡2:02)
gt ¡0:15 (¡2:35) ¡0:15 (¡1:87) ¡0:12 (¡2:01) ¡0:17 (¡2:09)
bsst 0:21 (4:53) ¡ 0:21 (5:43) ¡
bss¡78t 0:005 (1:76) ¡ 0:005 (1:16) ¡
¿ dt ¡ 0:01 (2:10) ¡ 0:01 (2:42)
µprt 0:26 (1:67) 0:49 (2:61) 0:19 (3:99) 0:53 (2:75)
nprt¡1 0:26 (3:22) 0:20 (1:96) 0:27 (¡1:84) 0:18 (2:03)
d84 ¡0:02 (¡1:71) ¡0:03 (¡2:07) ¡0:02 (¡3:96) ¡0:04 (¡2:67)
d87 ¡0:05 (¡3:57) ¡0:07 (¡2:90) ¡0:05 (1:97) ¡0:07 (¡3:32)
R2 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:99
S:E: 0:012 0:016 0:012 0:016
(*): Instruments for the 3SLS estimation: ctt; nprt¡1; n
pr
t¡2; w
pr
t¡1; w
pr
t¡2;
yprt¡1; y
pr
t¡2; kt; k
pr
t¡1; k
ps
t ; k
ps
t¡1; it; d84; d87; t; t1:5; ¿dt or bsst and bss¡78
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Table 4: Production function. Spain, 1967-1998.
Dependent variable: yprt
OLS Restricted 3SLS¤ Restricted 3SLS¤
(bss in wages) (¿ d in wages)
coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat.
Cnt ¡1:73 (¡0:93) 0:51 (3:55) 0:58 (3:98)
yprt¡1 0:43 (2:13) 0:56 (3:32) 0:52 (3:06)
yprt¡2 ¡0:35 (¡1:84) ¡0:20 (¡1:41) ¡0:21 (¡1:41)
nprt 0:86 (5:60) 0:83 (5:86) 0:86 (5:87)
nprt¡1 ¡0:47 (¡2:57) ¡0:56 (¤¤) ¡0:59 (¤¤)
kt 0:66 (2:60) 0:37 (2:70) 0:42 (3:02)
gt¡1 0:43 (3:77) 0:34 (3:34) 0:39 (3:79)
t 0:04 (2:30) 0:04 (2:61) 0:04 (2:76)
t1:5 ¡0:006 (¡3:18) ¡0:005 (¡3:19) ¡0:006 (¡3:48)
R2 0:99 0:99 0:99
S:E: 0:012 0:013 0:013
(*): Instruments for the 3SLS estimation: ctt; nprt¡1; n
pr
t¡2; w
pr
t¡1; w
pr
t¡2;
yprt¡1; y
pr
t¡2; kt; k
pr
t¡1; k
ps
t ; k
ps
t¡1; it; d84; d87; t; t1:5; ¿dt or bsst and bss¡78
(**): Restricted coe¢cient
Table 5: Growth equations. OLS. Spain, 1967-1998.
Dependent variable: ¢kprt Dependent variable: ¢y
pr
t
bss in wages ¿ d in wages
coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat. coe¤. t-stat.
Cnt 0:07 (7:01) Cnt 0:02 (5:04) 0:02 (5:06)
¢nprt 0:42 (6:07) ¢y
pr
t¡1 0:12 (2:48) 0:12 (2:48)
¢wprt 0:17 (2:38) ¢at 1:00 (20:8) 1:00 (19:5)
¢bsst 0:07 (1:66) ¢n
pr
t 1:39 (23:5) 1:35 (21:8)
¿ dt ¡0:005 (¡5:29) ¢n
pr
t¡1 ¡0:76 (¡10:4) ¡0:74 (¡9:56)
ct¡1 ¡0:03 (¡3:09) ¢wprt 0:09 (2:29) 0:10 (2:30)
¢bsst¡1 0:04 (1:59) 0:04 (1:58)
¿ dt ¡0:001 (¡3:49) ¡0:001 (¡3:50)
R2 0:89 0:98 0:98
S:E: 0:007 0:004 0:004
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